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IN THE SUP~ COURT 




CEROLA DANSIE CALDERWOOD, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
vs. 
CONSTANCE E. PATTON ZARBOCK, 
Third Party Defendant-
Respondent. 
Case No. 15,671 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in tort for personal injuries alleged 
to have been caused the plaintiff, Elizabeth Weeks, who was 
a passenger in the second car of a four car chain reaction 
type collision which occurred at the 45th South Northbound 
on-ramp to I-15 on February 1, 1974 at approximately 7:30 
a.m. The appellant claims that the defendant, Cerola Dansie 
(Calderwood) and third-party defendant, Constance Elizabeth 
Patton Zarbock negligently caused the injuries complained of 
in the complaint. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury in the Third Judicial 
District Court on December 5, 6 and 7, 1977. The issues 
were submitted to ~he_jury on a Special Verdict form and the 
-------~-- --
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jury found that the defendant, Cerola Dan:l:.se lCalde;r;woodl 
was 100% negl~gent, wh:j:ch negligence was a prox~ate cause of 
the plaintiff's injuries, and assessed the amount of plaintiff's 
damages at $2,596.42 which was the total amount of plaintiff's 
special damages listed on plaintiff's Exhibit 3. The defendant, 
Constance Patton Zarbock was found 0% negligent (R. 228). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the judgment of the trial court 
vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial. Appellant 
further seeks an order from this court allowing interest on 
the amount of plaintiff's claimed special damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the morning of February 1, 1974 at approximately 
7:30a.m., (Tr. 443), appellant, Elizabeth Weeks, was involved 
in an automobile accident while on her way to work. The 
accident occurred at the 45th South northbound on-ramp to I-
15 in Salt Lake County. (Tr. 635). Four cars were involved 
in the accident, which was of the chain reaction collision 
type. The last of the four cars, which was driven by Cerola 
Dansie (Calderwood), hit the car directly behind appellant, 
which car was driven by Constance Patton Zarbock, and impelled 
that car into the car in which appellant was a passenger. 
The car in which appellant was riding was pushed into a 
truck directly in front of appellant as a result of the 
impact from behind. (Tr. 641-642). 
-2-
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Appellant in ~er amended comp~aint t~., 229-23lt, 
claimed damages for injuries sustained as a result of the 
accident against the defendant, Cerola Dansie (Calderwood} 
and also against the Third-Party Defendant, Constance Patton 
-------
Zarbock. Appellant also claimed special damages and interest 
on any special damages pursuant to §78-27-44 U.C.A. (1953, 
as amended) • 
During the trial, appellant offered expert medical 
testimony to the effect that she had not only suffered great 
pain, expense and loss of the ability to perform certain acti 
vities, but also sustained permanent disability from the 
injuries suffered in the accident. 
At the conclusion of both plaintiff's and the respective 
defendants' cases, the Court discussed the jury instructions 
with counsel in chambers. Many of the plaintiff's requested 
instructions were refused. 
After returning from lunch the jury retired at approxirna 
-----·1 
2:00p.m. to begin its deliberations and then returned at 
approximately 2:25p.m. with its verdict (R. 695). The jury 
- -----·-- --. -~-~ -- -.. 
found the defendant, Cerola Dansie (Calderwood) was 100% 
negligent and that her negligence was a proximate cause of 
the injuries complained of by the plaintiff. They f~und no 
negligence on the part of the Third-Party Defendant, Constanc' 
Patton Zarbock. The jury awarded $2,596.42 in damages which 
was the exact amount of the appellant's special damages (R. 
228 and plaintiff's exhibit 3). 
-3-
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' 
r 
The following specific objections were Illade to the 
Court's instructions and its refusal to give pl~inttff'~ 
requested jury instructions and fori~~ the basis for this 
appeal: 
1) Objection to court's refusal of instructions 4 
and 5 which directed a finding of negligence against both 
defendants. pp. Tr 692, 693. 
2) Objection to the form of the special verdict 
---------
on the grounds that question number 4 should have detailed 
-- . ,.---·- ....------·---· . --~- -
both general and special damages in order to allow accurate 
.. -----"-. ~~---~-- -------~ 
apportionment of such. Tr. 693, 694. 
• ·-~- _._......__ ____ _, _ Ti 
3) Objections of the court's instructions 1, 5, 
7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19 and 21 on the grounds that 
the instructions were repetitious and placed an undue burden 
on plaintiff through reemphasis. Tr 694, 695. 
The Court submitted it's inst~u~~-~~~s to the jury ~n~ 
with a special verdict form containing four written inter-
rogatories:-- (R., 228) This special verdict form did not 
allow for a differentiation between general and special 
damages. Specifically, special verdict question no. 4 read: 
"What is the total amount of damages sutained by the plaintiff, 
Elizabeth \'leeks, as a result of the accident: $ ______ _ 
Appellant objected both at the time of the in-chambers 
conference and on the record after the jury had been instructed, 
and while the jury was at lunch, prior to retiring to begin 
its deliberations, to the instructions actually given by the 
-4-
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Court and to the form of the SJ?ecial verdict. 
695). 
(_T;r. 690-
After returning from lunch, the jury retired and deliber-
ated for approximately 25 minutes. The special verdict 
rendered assessed 100% liability to Cerola Dansie (Calderwood) 
and 0% liability to Constance E. Patton Zarbock. The amount 
of damages awarded was $2,596.42, the exact figure which 
appellant presented as the total of her special damages. 
The appellant also made a motion, after the jury had 
returned it's verdict, for an additur (Tr. 697-698) on the 
grounds that the jury had only awarded special damages and 
that an award of special damages cannot be made without an 
award of general damages and later made a Motion For a Hew 
Trial (R, 239-240) both of which was denied. Plaintiff-
appellant now takes this appeal. 
ARGU~lliNT ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIEi'IT BECAUSE AN AWARD OF 
SPECIAL DAMAGES CANNOT BE MADE WITHOUT AN AWARD OF GENERAL 
DAl>iAGES WHERE SUCH HAVE BEEH PROVEN. 
As is previously indicated, the award of damages made ~ 
the jury equalled the amount plaintiff claimed as special d~ 
to the penny. (See plaintiff's Exhibit 3). It is extremely 
unlikely that the jury would come up with that particular 
figure, $2,596.42, unless they were simply awarding the pla~ 
the special damages she proved at trial. It is conceded, of 
-~-
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course, that because of the form of the special verd~ct, ~0 one 
-
can say for sure what was, being awarded by· the jury. The law 
is clear in this jurisdiction and in the 23 jurisdictions 
that have ruled on the subject that an award of only special 
damages where there is proof of general damages is inadequate 
as a matter of law. Cohn v. J. c.P~~Y. Co., 537 P.2d 306 
(Utah, 1975); Langton v. International Transport Co., 26 
Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1211 (1971); Boden v. Suhrmann, 8 
Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826 (1958). (See also the annotation of 
this Point at 20 A.L.R. 2d 276 and the cases cited in the 
Later Case Service.) 
The Langton and Cohn cases involve situations where the 
verdict forms requ~~e~~e j \lEX-.~_ !P.:=~ifx_ separate 1 y ·general and 
special damages. In both cases, the jury .a-.w<!_r_d,~_zero ($~~ 
,.._--~4 -~=---'--- -· 
general damages and some amount as special damages. In both 
---· ....... ---
cases, the Utah Supreme Court held that such an award was 
_ __.. _-_..,_. ---~ --·-) 
improper. 
In the Langton case, which was an action for personal 
injuries, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendant and assessed no general damages 
but $868.25 special damages and $600.00 property damage, the 
Court stated: 
In the instant case, it must be conced-
ed that if the plaintiff were entitled to an 
award of special damages, he was entitled to 
be compensated, under the evidence, for pain 
and suffering and a loss of 22-1/2 days' wages 
irrespective of prospective damages which the 
jury and the trial court evidently doubted. 
Obviously the jury failed to consider these 
items of damage. The verdict was defective 
-6-
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in form in that it did not comprehend all the 
items of damage contained in the instructions 
given by the court, it was therefore insuffi-
cient. 491 P.2d at 1214. 
In that case, the fact that the jury did not consider 
or award any amount as general damage was obvious on the 
face of the verdict form. The verdict form had a line for 
-...~·-..·----
general damages, a line for speci~l.d~agee, and a line for 
~ --.._ ... .._,__---, 
property damage. The jury entered the word "none" on the 
-- ----___.._.... 
line for general damages. The Utah Supreme Court stated, as 
is quoted above, that such an award is defective on its 
face. Such a defect in form must be corrected, according to 
the Supreme Court in that case, pursuant to Rule 47(r) by 
sending the jury out to redeliberate and correct their 
obvious error. (See Langton, supra. 491 P.2d at 1215.) 
While a logical analysis of the jury's award in this 
case leads one to the conclusion that the jury in the instant 
case also neglected to make any award for general damages, 
the verdict as rendered by the jury has no defect on its 
....._ _________________________ ~-- --
face. The jury verdict was regular according to the definiti 
given in the Langton case. In Langton this Court said: 
"The verdict was defective in form in that it did 
not comprehend all the items of damage contained 
in the instructions given by the court, it was 
therefore, insufficient." 
491 P.2d at 1214. 
The jury verdict given in the instant case did comprehend 
all the items of damage listed on the special verdict form 
submitted to the jury. Langton, supra, Sparks v. Bernston, 
112 P.2d 742, 19 Cal.2d 308 (1941), Crowe v. Sacks, 283 P.2c 
689, 692 (Cal. 1955). 
In this type of case, Rule 47(r) does not apply, but 
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,,~~~ 
Rule 59 (_a)_ l5 )_ applies. ~ule 5.9la)_ (?)_, U.~.C.J>., states that 
a new trial may be granted where the verdict prov~des: 
(_5) excessive or inadequate damages, appearing 
to have been given under the influence of pas-
sion or prejudice. 
In distinguishing when the jury must be sent out to 
redeliberate before discharge pursuant to Rule 47{.r} or whether a 
new trial is to be granted pursuant to Rule 59(a) (5), the 
Supreme Court in Langton, supra, stated: 
There is a basic distinction between an 
insufficient or informal verdict and a verdict 
regular on its face, which awards inadequate 
damages, appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. Rule 59(a) 
(5). In the latter case, a new trial must be 
granted to correct the error. In the former 
case, counsel has an opportunity to assert an 
objection and the court, under Rule 47 {.r), 
U.R.C.P., may return the jury for further 
deliberation and further instruction to correct 
the irregularity. 491 P.2d at 1215. 
Counsel for appellant objected to the form of the Special 
-· -· ----
Verdict as indicated previously. The jury verdict carne back 
on the Special Verdict form with the blank for plaintiff's 
"damages" clearly filled out and a figure inserted. 
Counsel for appellant then immediately called the matter 
to the attention of the Court and indicated tha!_Ee_~i~yed 
it was the law that .. a jury could _not ':ward _ s12=.::ial _ dama~es 
without an award of general damages as well. (Tr. 697-698) · 
The Court then requested counsel to submit a written motion 
and memorandum in connection with the matters raised by 
plaintiff's counsel. (Tr, 698) 
-8-
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? 
l?OJNT :0: 
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR OR DIFFERENTIATE 
SPECIAL DAMAGES Al.~D GENERAL DAMAGES IN THE SPECIAL VERDICT FOI 
WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT CONFUSING TO THE JURY AND CONSTITUTru 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The court must provide separate blanks for amounts of 
general and special damages so th~t the jury may properly 
-( differentiate between specia~ and_9~~~ra~_damages and award 
( both general and special damages. 
_ _.._ .. : ~ ·- ~---- ·~-·--. -~ --· _,_ .. _. ' 
Such a differentiation is required by statute. Section 
78-27-44 U.C.A. (1953) permits the plaintiff in a personal in 
action to recover interest of eight (8%) percent per annum on 
the award of any special damages by the judge or jury. Where 
the plaintiff claims this interest, as the appellant did in 
- ~----·· ---
. ~~-~· .. ----- -~-------
this case, (See Amended Complaint (R. 229-231), the Court is 
bound to require the jury to set forth special damages sep-
-----
arately. 
The plaintiff requested that the Court require the jury 
state both the special and general damages separately, on thr 
separate occasions: 
{1) Plaintiff's requested jury instructions - SpM 
Verdict form. (R. 223, 223). 
(2} At the in-chambers conference between the cou: 
and respective counsel. 
(3) During the exceptions taken to the jury in~r 
by plaintiff's counsel (Tr., 692-693). Counsel for appellan 
specifically objected to the Special Verdict form which was 
-9-
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w• # U#W. 2 J$ !S.JQ$ d.hQij 
given the jury, expressing his concern that the:. jury would~ be 
confused and would enter an ward of specials only on the 
Special Verdict form. (Tr, 692, 693). 
The fact that the amount awarded as damages by the 
jury, $2,596.42, is exactly the amount claimed by appellant 
in her Exhibit #3, entitled "Summary of Medical Specials", 
strongly indicates that the jury awarded only special damages. 
Because the special verdict form did not require the jury to 
differentiate between general and special damages, however, it is 
impossible to know for certain what elements of damage the 
jury considered in making it's award. 
Due to the impossibility of ascertaining the precise 
amount of the award of special damages, it makes it difficult 
for the court to assess interest against the award. As will 
be explained more fully in a subsequent point. Appellant 
contends that she is entitled to an award of interest on her 
special damages and the inability of the court to grant this 
claim constitutes reversible error and denies a right given to her 
by statute. (See §78-27-44 U.C.A. ll953), as amended.) 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ASSESS INTEREST 
Oi~ THE PLAINTIFF'S SPECIAL DAHAGES AS A MATTER OF PROCEDURAL 
LAW At~D THE FAILURE TO DO SO IS CAUSE FOR REMAND. 
The controversy over the award of interest on the 
special damages arises because the cause of action in the 
instant case occurred in 1974 while the section which allows 
-10-
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the award of tnte~est on specia~ dama9es 
the Utah State Le9islat~J;e ~ntil 1975. 
was not enacted 1>y, 
The governin9 section, 7 8-2 7-4 4 , U. C • A. (19 53 , as amendel 
reads as follows: 
"In all actions brought to recover damages 
for personal injuries sustained by any 
person, resulting from or occasioned by the 
tort of any other person, corporation, 
association or partnership, whether by neg-
ligence or willful intent of that other 
person, corporation, association or part-
nership, and whether that injury shall have 
resulted fatally or otherwise, it shall be 
lawful for the plaintif( ,!!!__~he s;ompla~~!-~ t:.o 
cra1m 1.nterest on the spe~iaJ,.damages ~leged 
from the date of the occurrence of the act · 
giving· rise to The -cause of action and it 
snail fie- tEe CI"uty~ o£ the court: in enterTng 
judgment for plaintiff in that action, to add 
to the amount of damages assessed by the ver 
diet of the jury, or found by the court, inter-
est on that amount calculated at 8S per annum 
from the date of the occurrence of the act 
giving rise to the cause of action to the date 
of entering the judgment, and to include it in 
that judgment." (Emphasis added) 
It is the duty of the court, in entering the judgment, t 
add interest thereon. 
The section uses general language and does not specifica 
say whether the section is to apply to judgments which are 
rendered after the effective date of the section whose 
underlying cause of action accrues prior to the statute's 
--~ - ---~ 
effective date. 
This court has not had an opportunity to make a ruling 
on the application of this statute to the facts of this case 
The question of whether an interest statute giving 6% 
on special damages in personal injury cases in Oklahoma shou 
-11-
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be applied retrospectively was directly before the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court. The Oklahoma statute differed from the Utah 
statute in the time when the interest begins to accrue, 
which in Oklahoma is from the time the suit is brou~~' and 
which in Utah is the time the cause of action accrues. This 
difference is not pertinent to the rule of law laid down by 
the Oklahoma courts. 
The court in Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363 (Okla, 1973) 
stated: 
"A question, then, is whether there is in 
12 O.S. 1971, §727, subd. 2. a legislative 
intent, clearly expressed, or necessarily 
implied from the language used that requires 
1. consideration, and 2. retrospective appli-
cation, of the 6% interest matter. We think 
that there is. That the legislature may, in 
its discretion, establish interest that will 
accrue on a judgment, is, of course, recog-
nized. Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon 
Corp., supra. That the "interest" here has 
the effect of damages does not affect the matter. 
Like costs, interest is recoverable by statute 
(Baldwin v. Collins, (Okl. 1970), 479 P.2d 
567), and the_l~~~slatur~ .h<!~ .9Q_prescribed 
it. It- is attached by legislative fg:L (Fos-
ter v: Quigley, (19621,94 R.I. -211; 179 A.2d 
494--a retrospective intere~t_c~se~ ~e), 
and is proper. Not being of the substance of 
the right of action (Foster v. Quigley, supra), 
but being a directive to the trial court, then 
it becomes a mode of procedure which the court 
was bound to follow. 
Since judgments bear interest as prescribed by 
12 O.S. 1971, § 727, subd. 2. although the 
judgments make no provision theref~r, and it 
being a ministerial duty to award 1nter~st 
in proper cases, an erroneous award ~f 1nterest 
on a judgment may be corrected by th1s cou:r:t 
on appeal even though the error was not ra1sed 
in the motion for new trial or petition in error." 
(515 P.2d at 1365). 
-12-
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In another Oklahoma case the facts were analogous to 
the appellant's case. The suit was commenced March 29, 
1971 (the statutory time for the beginning of interest 
accrual) but ~he statute was not approved until June 16, 
1971. A verdict was returned in July 6, 1973 and the ~al 
court refused to add interest. On appeal the Oklahoma Supret 
Court said that it would follow Benson v. Blair, supra, in 
allowing interest because the adding of interest was procedm 
rather than substantive and must be allowed where the 
statute is in effect at the time the judgment is rendered. 
(See Fields v. Volkswagen, 555 P.2d. 48 (Okla., 1.976 at 63), 
For other cases holding similarly see: Ballog v. Knight Ne.: 
Inc., (1969), 381 Mich. 527, 164 N.W. 2d 19, M.E. Trapp Asso 
ated v. Tankersly 206 Okl. 118, 240 P.2d 1091. (1941). 
In a case dealing with interest on refunds of tax 
franchise payments, the California Supreme Court in People o: 
State of California v. Union Oil Company of California, 310 
P. 2d 409 (1957), held: 
"A statutory interest right for a particular 
period depends upon the law in effect at 
that time ... Accordingly, plaintiff con-
cedes defendant's right to the interest on 
over payments for the period prior to July 
10, 1947, the effective date of the amend-
ment." (See page 412). (Emphasis added) 
In conclusion, the statutory right to interest is a pfi 
legislative mandate and requires the giving of interest if 
the statute is in effect at the time the judgment was ren~ 
-13-
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POINT IV 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE INDICATE THAT THE YE~ICT WAS GIVEN 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE, RESULTING IN 
INADEQUATE DN•ffiGES BEING AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
Rule 59(a) (6), provides that where there is evidence of 
some prejudice or improper consideration by the jury leading to 
an award of excessive or inadequate damages, the Court has 
broad discretion to grant a new trial. e/. ~ ~ J ~ 
In considering the decision to grant a new trial, the Court 
is empowered to exercise its discretion and judgment, taking into 
------.... - ----~-
consideration matters which go beyond strict questions of law. 
In commenting on this function of the trial court, the Utah 
Supreme Court said in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 
701 (1961) that the trial court may properly order a new trial 
--------~ ~ 
when: 
. . it seems clear that the jury had 
misapplied or failed to take into account 
the proven facts; or misunderstood or 
disregarded the law; or made findings 
clearly against the weight of the evidence. 
(citations omitted). Such test depends 
largely upon the reaction and judgment of 
the trial judge." 12 Utah 2d at 354. See 
also Paul v. Kirkendall, 261 P.2d 670 
(1953). 
Appellant urges to this court that the District Court 
abused it's discretion by failing to grant a new trial or in 
the alternative an additur because of the clear evidence that 
the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice in that they 
did not believe that the defendants were covered by insurance, 
-14-
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and thus lessened the amqunt o~ theLr aw~rd. U>ee a,f ;eidavit 
of appellant's counsel, R. 236-238). 
The attorney for pl~intiff herein has filed an affidavit 
setting forth the particular facts which indicate prejudice 
on the part of the jury. 
In paragraph 5 of said affidavit, counsel indicates 
that solely by chance, he and the attorney for one of the 
defendants overheard a portion of the conversation in which 
members of the jury expressed concern as to whether or not 
the defendants had insurance. The jurors expressed the 
---" belief that the defendant did not have insurance. The 
verdict awarded by the jury is obviously inadequate in that 
it does not compensate the plaintiff for any amount of 
general damage, i.e., pain, suffering or disability. The 
amount of time which the jury took to deliberate was very 
limited, at most 20 to 25 minutes. 
The facts of this case set forth above indicate that it 
is highly more probable that the jury's verdict was the 
result of their fear that the defendants did not have any 
insurance and could not withstand a judgment for the full 
amount of the damages which the plaintiff had sustained 
rather than a finding that the amount a\varded was, in fact, 
the full extent of the plaintiff's damages. In such a 
situation, justice and fairness clearly calls for a new 
trial. 
This court has not directly considered the issue of 
when discussion by the jurors with regard to the defendant's 
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insurance may constitute grounds for a new trial. In the 
case of Land v. York Oil Corporation, 280 S.W.2d 628 (1955, 
~~!' ;~v. AJtp.), it was shown that some members of the jury 
had discussed and speculated upon defendants' possible lack 
of insurance. The court, in discussing the question of 
insurance, said: 
"This wholly immaterial matter was made 
a subject of improper speculation, the 
court ruled, and took place while the 
jury was deliberating upon the issue 
.regarding the liability of the def-
endant." 47 ALR.3d 1299 at Section 14, 
p. 1342. 
The court also found that the discussion was prejudicial because 
it was not casual and because there was no evidence of a timely 
warning or rebuke by another member of the jury. (47 ALR.3d 1342) 
The affidavit by appellant's counsel shows that the 
jury in this case was making improper speculations with 
regard where the defendants had liability insurance. The 
fact that these speculations were prejudicial to the appellant 
is evidenced by the fact that the jury failed to give any 
award for pain, suffering or disability all of which were in 
evidence at the trial. 
In this situation, the Supreme Court has authority to 
review the exercise of the trial court's discretion and to grant 
a new trial. 
POINT V 
THE COURT'S JURY INSTRUCTIONS lvERE CONFUSING AND IMPROPER 
DUE 'ro REPETITION \vHICH \vAS CARRIED TO THE POINT OF PLACING 
-16-
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UNDUE EMPHASIS TO THE DEFENDANTS' POSITIONS ON BOTR PACTS ~·D , 
THE LAW. 
The general rule is stated in the case of Spur Feeding 
Company v. Fernandez, 472 P.2d 12, 106 Ariz. 143, 49 ALR.3d 
925, (1970). The Court said: 
"Ordinarily a trial court should not 
single out any particular or individual 
factual aspect of litigation for special 
instructions since there is that danger that 
the jury may unduly attach significance to 
it ••• : 472 P.2d at 17. 
The Idaho GOUrts have held that repetition of one theory, or 
of one view or aspect of the case is not approved where the 
effect is to give undue prominence or emphasis to such theory c: 
view, as against others which the jury must also weigh. Addyv. 
Stewart, 69 Idaho 357, 207 P.2d 498 (1949), 75 Am.Jur 2d 
Trial -597 §630. 
It is also improper to submit instructions to the jury 
which unduly emphasizes the burden upon the plaintiff. In 
the case of Marquess v. Taylor, 331 P.2d 879, 214 Or. 619 
(1958) the court criticized repetitious jury instructions 
given in the case saying: 
. . • we feel impelled to mention that 
the instructions were repetitious and 
unduly emphasized the burden upon 
plaintiff. p. 882 
The above case dealt with improper jury instructions concerni~ 
contributory negligence in an automobile personal injury 
case, but the principle of placing an unfair burden on the 
plaintiff through repetition is particularly applicable in 
-17-
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the instant case because the prejudice went not to a particular 
element of the case but to the general burden of proof to be 
carried by the plaintiff. 
In illustration of the undue emphasis placed upon the 
appellant and her burden of proof, the following exerpts 
from the jury instructions are cited: 
Instruction No. 11 - "The burden is on the 
party making a claim or defense to prove 
the essential elements of her claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence." (R., 129) 
.Instruction No. 12 - "The party upon whom 
the burden of proof rests must sustain it 
by a preponderance of the evidence. If 
the evidence does not preponderate in favor 
of the plaintiff making the charge of neg-
ligence, then she has failed to fulfill 
her burden of proof .•• " (R., 130) 
Instruction No. 13 - "Before you may find 
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against 
either defendant in this case, you must 
find from a preponderance of the evidence 
. • . The burden of proof is likewise upon 
the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence her damage." (R., 131) 
Instruction 18 contains reiterations 
of the burden of proof which plaintiff had 
to meet at the trial. (R., 136) 
Instruction 19 - "The burden is upon the 
parties claiming damages to prove by a 
preponderance or greater weight of the 
evidence the amount of their injuries or 
damages reasonably and naturally flowing 
from such injuries. The burden likewise 
rests upon the parties claiming damages 
to establish by a preponderance or greater 
weight of the evidence the nature, character 
and extent of her suffering or injury and the 
duration thereof." (R. 137) 
A complete reading of the above instructions shows that 
the instructions are not simply clarifying in nature and are 
-18-
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repetitious to the point of being prejudicial. The instruct! 
do not simply define what a preponderance of the evidence 
is, they repeat and unduly emphasize the plaintiff's burden 
of proof. 
The prejudice resulting from the undue emphasis on 
plaintiff-appellant's burden or proof was increased by the 
fact that the Court made little mention of respondent's 
burden of proving their allegations while it continually 
mentioned plaintiff-appellant's burden. 
The Court also placed undue emphasis on the point of 
not indulging in speculation or conjecture. See Instructions 
Numbered 1 and 12 (R. 119, 130). 
The over emphasis on speculation and conjecture placed 
an undue burden by creating an inference that the plaintiff's 
case was at least in part based on speculation, or conjecture. 
This was particularly crucial with regard to plaintiff's 
ongoing future damages. At the time of the trial, the 
plaintiff was continuing to suffer severe pain and a restrictE 
activity schedule. There was testimony that plaintiff's 
injuries and disabilities would continue on for some indef~~ 
period of time. In assessing general damages the jury would 
have to reduce the damages to their present value. This 
reduction to present value requires a jury deliberation 
process which is somewhat analogous to speculation or conject 
and any undue emphasis on the concept of guessing, approxima· 
or speculating will always be prejudicial to a plaintiff w~ 
has continuing injury and damage as it was in this case. 
-19-
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The remainder of the jury instructions are repetitious 
and burdensome, though they are not patently prejudicial as 
are the above mentioned jury instruction. (See ~R. 1, 11, 12 
13, 18 and 19). 
The result of the undue emphasis upon certain aspects of 
the case is that appellant was denied a fair trial. The fact 
that no general damages were apparently given shows that the 
jurors did attach undue significance to the improper instructions 
and under all the facts and circumstances appellant should be 
granted a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
It is, perhaps, significant to note that both the 
plaintiff's Special Verdict form (R. 222-223) and the defendant, 
Cerola Dansie (Calderwood's) Special Verdict Form (R. 224-
225) requested that the court set forth general and special 
damages separately. These requests were denied by the court 
and the Special Verdict form requested by the Third-Party 
Defendant, Constance Elizabeth Patton (R-168) was substantially 
submitted by the court. The Special Verdict form did not 
separate general and special damages. 
Plaintiff submits that an award of special damages 
without general damages is inadequate as a matter of law. 
Had the verdict form contained a place for the jury to award 
both special and general damages, the verdict form, in that 
event, would have shown zero dollars awarded as general 
damages, which would have constituted an improper award and 
-20-
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the trial court, pursuant to Rule 47(r) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, could have directed the jury to reconsider 
their verdict and correct its impropriety. Furthermore, 
plaintiff is entitled to know exactly how much was awarded 
as special damages and how much as general damages in any 
event so that she may be awarded interest on the specials 
pursuant to § 78-27-44 U.C.A. 1953, as amended as well as 
for tax purposes and other reasons. 
The discussion of the defendants insurance, or lack 
of it (R. 236-238) , resulted in inadequate damages being 
awarded to the plaintiff. Both defendants were young, 
attractive and had married between the time of the accident 
and the date of the trial (Tr. 665, 633). It may be reasonabi 
to assume that the jury did not want to "punish" either of 
the defendants financially, especially since the comments of 
the jurors as reflected in the affidavit of plaintiff's 
counsel (R. 236-238), indicated that they did not believe 
that there was insurance coverage and therefore, the amount 
of any judgement would have to be borne by the defendants 
themselves. The discussion of lack of insurance by the 
three jurors was prejudicial and denied plaintiff a fair 
trial. 
The instructions given by the court placed undue emphasi 
upon the plaintiff's burden of proof and made it difficult 
if not impossible, for her to sustain the extra burden both 
with regard to liability and damages. The trial court 
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should have taken extra care and precaution to insure that 
duplicitious instructions on the same general areas of the 
law submitted by two separate defendants were not given. 
The instructions given tilted the scales against the plaintiff 
and prevented a fair trial. 
In the event that this court does not see fit to remand 
this case for a new trial on the merits, plaintiff-appellant 
submits that the trial court should be ordered to amend its 
judgrnent_to allow interest on the total award as special 
damages at eight percent (8%) per annum from the date of the 
accident. The statutory right to interest is a procedural 
legislative mandate effective at the time the judgment was 
rendered. 
DATED at Provo, Utah this /Oftt day of May, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
()(1{9 /f£1. cR~ 
Craig M. Snyder, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Brief to Stephen G. 
Morgan, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent at 345 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, and John M. Chipman, 
Attorney for Third Party Defendant-Respondent at Kearns 
B"ilUioq, Salt Lake City, Utah, 8410~--~yf ~­
Nay, 1978. ~)1.__, 
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